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THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MERGER
CONTROL REGULATION AND THE SHORT-TERM
HORIZON OF UNITED STATES FIRMS
Marsha Cope Huie* and Stephen D. Hogan**
INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 1989, the European Community (EC) adopted the
1989 EC Council Regulation No. 4064 (Regulation) to provide effec-
tive control of mergers ("concentrations") at the EC level.' Prior to the
adoption of the Regulation, such merger control had not existed. The
Treaty of Rome of 1957 (Treaty),2 which established the EC in 1958,
contains no provisions specifically regulating mergers. Article 85 of the
Treaty, the functional equivalent of section one of the United States
Sherman Antitrust Act, prohibits agreements between "undertakings"
in restraint of trade.3 Article 86, the functional equivalent of section
two of the Sherman Act, prohibits a party from abusing its dominant
position. 4 The cases which discuss the application of articles 85 and 86
to merger activity have revealed gaps in the Treaty and created uncer-
tainty about whether these articles apply to mergers.'
The Regulation increased the powers of the EC Commission (Com-
mission), an institution created by the Treaty of Rome6 that operates in
conjunction with the Council,7 the Parliament,' and the European
* LL.M., Cambridge University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Tcnnes-
see; Professor of Law, St. Mary's University of San Antonio.
** Ph.D., University of Oklahoma; Professor of Finance, Eastern Illinois University.
The authors are grateful for the research assistance of Jon Mark Hogg.
1. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989) [hereinafter Regulation].
2. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-11) (offi-
cial English translation) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome or EC Treaty].
3. Id. art. 85.
4. Id. art. 86. Article 3(f) generally proscribes any trade abuse which distorts EC
competition. Id. art. 3(f).
5. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (describing the Continental Can
case and the Philip Morris/Rothmans case).
6. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
7. Id. art. 145. The Council, the EC's primary legislative body, is composed of one
foreign minister from each of the 12 member states. Id. art. 146. If. however, the
matter under consideration by the Council is agricultural policy, for example, the vari-
ous ministers of agriculture will comprise the Council. Id. arts. 40, 43. The Council.
which often works in collusion with the Commission at the expense of the Parliament,
coordinates economic policy and makes political decisions. Id. arts. 145, 149, 152, '153,
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Court of Justice.9 The Commission has three main functions: adminis-
tration;' 0 legislation;" and supervision. 2 One of the Commission's
main administrative duties is to monitor competition (antitrust)
policy."3
155, 157, 159, 160, 162. Under the Treaty, the Council generally cannot act to imple-
ment legislation unless the Commission has first proposed the legislation. Id. arts. 21,
43, 44, 49, 54, 63, 69, 75, 89.
Article 87 of the Treaty directs the Council to adopt regulations (legal instruments
that are both binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the member states)
and directives (legal instruments binding on the member states only as to the required
result) necessary for implementing articles 85 and 86. Id. art. 87. The Council adopted
the main implementing regulation in 1962. Council Regulation No. 17, 204 J.O.
COMM. EUR. 62 (1962).
8. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 137. The Parliament, principally a debating
society, has enjoyed little real power and, until recently, has possessed only the right of
"consultation." Treaty of Rome, Art. 137, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4302
(1987). The Single European Act of 1986 has strengthened the powers of Parliament.
Id. Now, in certain cases, such as those having to do with the free movement of goods,
Parliament can insist on its right of "cooperation." Id. The Parliament, in such cases,
can force a second reading of legislation. Id. 1 20,025.
A recent decision in the Court of Justice further strengthens the Parliament. Since
the Single European Act of 1986, the Council enacted Council Regulation 3954/87 on
Dec. 22, 1987, which set maximum levels of radioactivity for foodstuffs after the
Chernobyl crisis. European Parliament v. EC Council, case 70188, 4 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) T 95,500 (1990). In enacting this regulation, the Council did not consult
the Parliament. Id. The Parliament sued the Council in the Court of Justice to annul
the regulation. Id. The Court of Justice ruled that the case may proceed. Id. 1 95,501.
9. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 164. The European Court of Justice includes
the new Court of First Instance which was authorized by the Single European Act of
1986. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) art. 11, at 6 (1987);
Council Decision of 24 October 1988, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 319) 1 (1988). The
Court of First Instance, which began operations in the fall of 1990, has jurisdiction to
hear, inter alia, appeals from the Commission in competition law cases. 31 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 319) art. 3, at 2 (1988).
10. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 155. The Commission ensures the proper
application of the Treaty. Id. The Treaty gave the Commission "its own power of deci-
sion ... in the manner provided for in this Treaty." Id. The Council delegates power to
the Commission to implement rules that have been enacted by the Council. Id.
11. Id. art. 149. In most cases, the Commission enjoys the right of initiative, which
means that the Council can only enact legislation that the Commission has first pro-
posed. Id.
12. Id. arts. 169, 171. The Commission has a broad supervisory function. The
Treaty obligates the Commission to see that "the provisions of the Treaty and of the
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied." Id. art. 155. These
provisions impose upon the Commission the duty to ensure that the member states
fulfill their Treaty obligations. Id. If they do not, the Commission may initiate proceed-
ings against the defaulting member state in the European Court of Justice. Id. art. 169.
13. Id. The Commission's directorate-general for competition ("DG-IV") adminis-
ters the EC's competition policy. Id. Article 89 of the Treaty charges the Commission
with ensuring the application of articles 85 and 86, and making decisions remedying
infringement of these articles. Id. art. 89. Article 87 confers power on the Council to
make regulations or directives effectuating articles 85 and 86. Id. art. 87. Council Reg-
ulation 17 of 1962 (articles 3, 15, and 16) specifically grants to the Commission the
power to order an undertaking to cease infringement of the Community competition
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The Regulation extended the Commission's administrative function
to include oversight of all proposed mergers, acquisitions, and other
business combinations having a "community dimension." 4 A commu-
nity dimension exists under the Regulation when the following quanti-
tative thresholds are met: (1) the aggregate worldwide sales of all the
undertakings concerned exceed five billion European currency units
(ECUs);"6 and (2) the aggregate community-wide sales of at least two
of the companies concerned exceed 250 million ECUs."6 An intrastate
exception applies, however, when each of the firms concerned obtains
more than two-thirds of its aggregate community-wide sales within a
single member state. 17 The Regulation considers a concentration which
satisfies this exception to have no community dimension.
If a community dimension exists, parties to the concentration, or an
acquirer seeking a controlling interest in an "undertaking" (firm), must
provide pre-merger notification to the Commission.18 Once the Coin-
rules and to levy fines and/or penalties against violators. Id. See infra notes 42 and 49
on the Commission's powers under the Regulation.
14. See Regulation, supra note 1, preamble, 1 10, 11 (limiting the scope of the
application of this Regulation to concentrations which have a community dimension
and a specified rate of aggregate turnover).
The new merger control regulation directly empowers the Commission to police
large-scale business combinations affecting the EC. Id. art. 8(l). It authorizes the
Commission to require member states to investigate "concentrations." Id. art. 12(l).
The Regulation delineates the investigatory powers of the Commission. Id. art. 13. The
Regulation also imposes fines not exceeding 10% of the aggregate worldwide sales to
non-conforming firms, and allows the Commission to impose periodic penalty payments
for each day a firm delays after a Commission decision. Id. arts. 14(2), 15(l).
Parties may appeal a Commission decision to the European Court of Justice, which
is responsible for ensuring that the Treaty is correctly interpreted and applied. Treaty
of Rome, supra note 2, art. 173. Article 173 gives the Court jurisdiction to review the
legality of decisions of the Council and Commission. Id. Article 164 requires the Court
to ensure proper interpretation and application. Id. art. 164. See supra note 9 on the
new Court of First Instance.
15. Regulation, supra note 1, art. l(2)(a). The European Currency Unit (ECU) is
the artificial currency of the EC. 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3603 (1986). It is a
trade-weighted, adjustable pegged, exchange-rate currency used by the 12 member-
nations in their trade transactions. Id. It is not generally used by non-EC nations. Id.
As of Apr. 16, 1991, $1.24 would buy 1.00 ECU. Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1991, at C12.
16. Regulation, supra note 1, art. l(2)(b).
17. Id. This article defines the scope of the Regulation and, therefore, the scope of
a community dimension. Id. Another provision mandates that a qualified majority of
the Council review the quantitative thresholds by December 21, 1993 (thresholds sub-
ject to change). Id. art. 1(3). The Regulation provides different thresholds for financial
institutions and insurance companies. Id. arts. 5(3)(a)-(b).
18. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4. Because even purely domestic United States
mergers might affect the Common Market, United States businesses with or without
assets located inside the EC that are vulnerable to seizure by the Community, are
subject to the pre-merger notification requirement of the Regulation. Compare Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1988) [hereinafter Hart-Scott-Rodino Act] (re-
quiring pre-merger notification and a 30 day waiting period). Under the Antitrust
1991]
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mission finds a community dimension, it will appraise the concentration
for its compatibility with the EC.1' If the concentration creates or
strengthens a dominant position resulting in a substantial diminution of
competition in the EC, the Commission will declare the concentration
incompatible.20
The Regulation offers a fascinating display of the evolution of feder-
alism in the EC. Article 21(2) of the Regulation generally establishes
exclusive Community competence on any concentration having a com-
munity dimension. The Regulation, however, lists two exceptions that
allow member states to take action that is, respectively, "strictly neces-
sary" or "appropriate." Under the distinct local market exception of
article 9, even if a community dimension exists, a member state may
nevertheless ask the Commission to refer a notified concentration to the
Guidelines for International Operations, the DOJ would not challenge a merger be-
tween foreign firms having all of their assets outside the United States which affects
U.S. trade. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, however, may still require pre-merger notifica-
tion to the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission. Under Hart-Scott-Rodino, a
transaction is exempted in two situations involving acquisition of American companies
or American sales market share by foreign firms. First, no notice is required where the
acquisition would not confer control over a United States company with annual net
sales or total assets exceeding $25 million, or of any company with assets in the United
States with a book value of $15 million or more. Second, the notice requirement is
waived where aggregate annual net sales of the merging firms in the United States are
less than $110 million and the aggregate book value of their assets in the United States
is less than $110 million. The EC Regulation contains no such exemption for foreign
merger activity.
The first notification to the Commission of a proposed merger came from the Re-
nault and Volvo companies on Oct. 4, 1990. 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,628
(1990). Renault proposed to purchase 25% of the shares of Volvo Car Corp. and 45%
of Volvo Trucks Corp. Id. Volvo proposed to acquire 20% of La R6gie Nationale des
Usines Renault, S.A., and 45% of Renault Vehicles Industriels. Id. The Commission
approved the merger on Nov. 9, 1990, based on compatibility with the EC. Id. 1
95,656. Regarding the joining of operations of cars, the Commission found the Regula-
tion inapplicable; no concentration of a community dimension existed in cross-share-
holdings of 25 %. Id. Regarding the joining of operations of trucks and buses, the Com-
mission found the Regulation applicable to the concentration of cross-shareholdings of
45% when considered with the degree of integration that already existed between Re-
nault and Volvo in related products. Id. The Commission, however, found that the
concentration did not create or strengthen a dominant position which would tend to
impede competition in the EC. Id.
On Jan. 7, 1991, the Commission asserted jurisdiction for the first time over a joint
venture under the Regulation. Gardner, Brussels Applies EC Merger Rules to Joint
Venture, Financial Times (London), Jan. 8, 1991, at 3. A joint venture is a collabora-
tive effort short of a merger that may be entered into for sound business reasons. For
example, firms may wish to pool their efforts in research and development, marketing,
or distribution. The Commission cleared such a "concentration" between Mitsubishi of
Japan and Union Carbide USA that was designed to increase the market share of the
firms. Id.
19. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
20. Id. arts. 2(2)-(3).
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appropriate national court.2 If the Commission decides that effective
competition is likely to be impeded significantly in a distinct local mar-
ket, the Commission may either deal with the case itself or it may de-
cide to relinquish its otherwise exclusive jurisdiction by referring the
case to the competent national authorities for treatment under national
competition law. Under the second exception, a member state may take
"4appropriate" measures over a concentration having a community di-
mension where "legitimate national interests" require national jurisdic-
tion. Public security, plurality of the media, and prudential rules are
examples of such interests.12 Furthermore, where the concentration
lacks a community dimension, a member state can ask the Commission
to act under article 22 of the Regulation.2s Smaller member states
without national merger control laws are most likely to invoke this
24provision.
The Regulation applies to two broad situations: (1) exclusively Euro-
pean mergers in which an EC company combines with another EC
company; and, (2) proposed mergers involving non-EC companies. This
article focuses on the latter rubric. This latter paradigm, in turn, has
three possible situations: (1) a combination between an EC firm and a
foreign firm (e.g., between a French firm and a United States firm); (2)
a combination between two non-EC firms having subsidiaries within
the EC (e.g., between two United States firms with subsidiaries in the
Community); and (3) a combination between two foreign-based compa-
nies exporting to the EC but having no EC subsidiaries, (e.g., between
two United States firms with no EC subsidiaries).
Under the first situation, involving the merger of an EC firm and a
foreign firm, the Regulation grants the Commission discretion which,
although unlikely, could result in the EC's adopting a policy prohibit-
ing foreign penetration of the domestic national market through foreign
merger and acquisition activity.25 The EC could invoke jurisdiction
based on a territorial theory of jurisdiction, a generally accepted theory
21. Id. arts. 9(2)-(3).
22. Id. art. 21(3). This is in accordance with the safeguard provision of article 223
of the EC Treaty, which allows a member state to act in derogation of the Treaty
where its national security is at stake. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 223.
23. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 22.
24. Id., art. 22(3). This "Dutch" clause will apply only until the quantitative
thresholds are reviewed, before the end of four years following the adoption of the
Regulation. Id. arts. 22(6), 1(3).
25. See id. art. 2(1)(a) (requiring, the Commission to "take into account the need
to preserve and develop effective competition within the common market in view of the
structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from
undertakings located either within or without the Community") (emphasis added).
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of international law.26 This theory grounds jurisdiction as long as the
foreign firm involved is "present" within the borders of the EC.27
The second and third situations, involving combinations between two
non-EC firms, implicate the controversial issue of extraterritoriality.
United States case law recognizes that the territorial effects theory de-
rives from, and is justified by, the objective territoriality principle that
is generally accepted in public international law.2" Under the territorial
effects theory, business practices, such as price concertation, taken
solely within one nation will subject the offending firm to the jurisdic-
tion of a second nation when the second nation suffers injury from
those practices. If, for example, two United States firms without sub-
sidiaries inside the EC fix prices inside the United States but export to
the EC through independent sales companies, the EC's assertion of ju-
risdiction over the United States firms would be based on the effects
doctrine.
Academics, most particularly the British, have often criticized this
expansive view of jurisdiction.29 United States courts, however, persist
26. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)
(stating that all legislation is prima facie territorial) (Holmes, C. J., quoting Ex parte
Blain, 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528 (1879)).
27. See HIGGINS, The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLI-
CATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES 3, 5-7 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984) [hereinafter HIGGINS]
(stating that territoriality is either subjective or objective). Subjective territoriality ex-
ists when a state has jurisdiction over acts originating within the territory but com-
pleted elsewhere. Id. at 7. Objective territoriality governs when a state has jurisdiction
over acts begun elsewhere but completed within its own territory. Id. at 7.
28. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(recognizing the effects doctrine).
29. See A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 (Wood Pulp) v. Commission, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 5193, 5214 [hereinafter Wood Pulp] (stating the United Kingdom's position,
intervening in opposition to the Commission, that the EC's assertion of jurisdiction in
casu could only be through the effects doctrine, a concept that neither the EC nor
international law accepts). In the strict United Kingdom view, only the controversial
territorial effects theory would ground jurisdiction over a company based in the United
States without separately incorporated subsidiaries within the EC. Id. The United
Kingdom vigorously rejects the effects doctrine. Id. at 5209. See British Nylon Spin-
ners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 2 All E.R. 780, 783 (C.A. 1962) (dictum of Sir
Raymond Evershed) (noting that English courts did not recognize extra-territorial ju-
risdiction). See also A. NEALE & M. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NA-
TIONAL JURISDICTION 186 n.21 (1988) (presenting the West German Federal Court of
Justice's acceptance of the Effects Doctrine). The German Court holds German compe-
tition law applicable where the effect within the territory is "sufficient." Id. Neale and
Stephens, however, interpret the German sich auswirken as adopting the principle of
objective territoriality in that some business conducted must have an effect within the
territory. Id. See Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am.
J. COMP. L. 579 (1983) (proposing diplomatic exchange over judicial process to re-
solve conflicting claims of authority); Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction under Custom-
ary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1984) (examining a way to balance the
interests of the regulating state against the foreign states likely to be injured by regula-
[VOL. 6:325
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in claiming power to act extraterritorially under the Effects Doctrine. 0
Although United States case law supports the doctrine of extraterritori-
ality, the EC may apply it against American interests. The Court of
Justice stopped short of adopting the Effects Doctrine in a recent
case.3' Under the Regulation, however, and consistent with this recent
case, the Commission could conceivably assume jurisdiction and enjoin
or levy fines32 against a merger of two American companies based en-
tirely outside the geographic confines of the EC.33 It is unclear whether
the Court of Justice would go this far. Not only may the Commission
attempt to reach beyond the EC's borders in exercising its powers, it
may also attempt to restructure those operating objectives, procedures,
and policies of non-EC firms which it finds objectionable, although this
is unlikely. 4
Part I of this article discusses the Regulation's technical aspects, em-
phasizing both the requirements which must be satisfied before the
Commission can act and the Commission's inherent powers to act ex-
traterritorially. Part II discusses merger suits brought under articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome instead of the Regulation. Finally, Part
III describes the case law as applied in three distinct situations.
I. LEGISLATION
By specifically addressing mergers, EC Council Regulation No. 4064
addresses an issue which articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome had
tory measures); Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Conflicts between Sovereign Nations, 19
INT'L LAW. 487 (1985) (discussing the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States' treatment of jurisdiction in conflicts between sovereign nations).
30. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(acknowledging the Effects Doctrine with regard to the interpretation and rationale of
antitrust legislation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402 (1988) (stating that "[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to ... conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory"). The United States Department of Justice, however,
has stated its intent to retreat from aggressive assertions of jurisdiction over foreign
firms. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations-1988, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109 (Nov. 10, 1988).
31. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (describing the European Court
of Justice's sidestepping of the Effects Doctrine in Wood Pulp).
32. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 14.
33. Compare Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 501
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 8, 1970) (involving impending merger arrangements between two
Swiss companies that would lead to acquisition of American companies and perhaps
diminish United States competition in the industry).
34. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission's role in
developing effective competition within the EC).
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previously covered inadequately.35 The Court of Justice applied article
86 to a merger only once, in 1973 in the Continental Can case,3" and
did not state that article 85 could be used against a merger until 1987,
in the Philip Morris case.37 According to the Commission, because the
Treaty of Rome fails to cover mergers per se, it operates to that extent
inconsistently with the harmonization of the EC scheduled for 1992.38
In particular, the Commission has long argued that it could not fulfill
its role of maintaining workable competition unless it gained clear pow-
ers to intervene in proposed business combinations.
39
A. REGULATION 4064
Most proposed business combinations within the EC do not require
Commission attention because they have negligible impact on overall
competitive conditions."0 Small mergers and buy-outs fall into this cat-
egory. They do not have a community dimension and they pose no
threat to overall competition and competitiveness. The Regulation gen-




Larger combinations, however, draw the Commission's attention and
encourage the Commission to use the wide discretion which the Regu-
lation grants it to review proposed business combinations. 42 The Regu-
35. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (describing how the Treaty of
Rome fails to address concentrations).
36. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, [1973] Eur.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215.
37. British Am. Tobacco Co. v. Commission, [1987] Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4487.
38. Tigner, Brussels Dateline, INT'L MGMT. 27 (1990).
39. See Commission, Third Report on Competition Policy (1974). The Commission
used the 1992 harmonization program as a catalyst to get the Council of Ministers to
agree to the new Regulation. Enactment of legislation in the EC is a tripartite process.
The Commission has the right of initiative (of proposing legislation) to the Council of
Ministers, which must then consult or cooperate with Parliament (called the European
"Assembly" in the United Kingdom). The Single European Act of 1986 enhanced the
relatively weak powers of the Parliament, instituting in some cases a new "cooperation"
procedure. Now Parliament can, in some cases, force the Council to make a second
reading of proposed legislation which the Council has previously rejected. See Single
European Act of Feb. 17, 1986, O.J. EUR. COMM. (L 169) 10 (1987) art. 118A(2)
(concerning adoption of directives setting minimum requirements for the safety and
health of workers).
40. Osborne, How the Common Market Will Control Large Mergers, 24 MERGERS
& AcQUISITIONs 65, 66 (1990).
41. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing a community dimension
as a necessary requisite to Commission action).
42. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (referring to the broad discretion
the Commission possesses concerning the protection of competition). But see supra
notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining that the Commission may act under
the Regulation only where a community dimension exists). The Regulation enhanced
[VOL. 6:325
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lation provides three triggers that allow the Commission to intervene to
control potential corporate merger abuses.
1. Community Dimension Defined by Quantitative Thresholds
The first trigger operates on a strictly numerical basis. It gives the
Commission the authority to review proposed combinations if quantita-
tive thresholds defining a community dimension are met. 3 The Regula-
tion does not apply if two-thirds or more of each party's total sales
occur within the same member state." For example, the Commission
could review a proposal by the British firm Hanson PLC (with total
sales of seven billion pounds or ten billion ECUs) to acquire the Italian
firm Olivetti (with total sales of nine trillion lire or six billion ECUs).
Both companies have sales of at least 250 million ECUs within the EC,
and two-thirds of their aggregate Community-wide sales are not within
one and the same EC country (either Great Britain or Italy).
The Commission, however, ordinarily would not have the authority
under the Regulation to review a proposal by Hanson to acquire an-
other British firm such as General Electric PLC (with total sales of six
billion pounds) because no Community dimension exists. In this situa-
tion both firms have more than two-thirds of their total Community-
wide sales within Great Britain. Because Hanson's proposed acquisition
of General Electric would operate strictly as a local concern, only Brit-
ain's Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the competent national au-
thority, may review it.45
the powers of the Commission over mergers only to the extent to which the Commis-
sion has not lost its power to proceed under EC Tready articles 85 and 86 against
small-scale mergers lacking a community dimension.
43. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing the quantitative
thresholds for finding a community dimension).
44. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 1(2). If each firm involved achieves more than
two-thirds of its aggregate community-wide sales within the same member state, no
community dimension exists. Id. art. 1(2)(b).
45. See Fair Trading Act, 1973, 21 and 22 Eliz. 2, ch. 41, § 64 (empowering the
United Kingdom's Office of Fair Trade to investigate mergers). See also R. MERKIN &
K. WILLIAMS, COMPETITION LAW: ANTITRUST POLICY IN THE U.K. AND THE EEC 244
(1984) (explaining that the secretary of state for Trade and Industry may refer certain,
usually large-scale, mergers to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission). The United
Kingdom also has a City of London Takeover Code regulating tender offers. Id. at
n.21. One exception to the Commission's lack of jurisdiction exists under article 22(3).
Ordinarily in this instance, under article 1(2), national law applies. Despite the lack of
a community dimension, however, a member state may request the Commission to in-
tervene if the concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position that would sig-
nificantly impede competition within the concerned member state. Regulation, supra
note 1, art. 22(3). Also, member states may act against mergers where a community
dimension exists if a local market is likely to be affected significantly.
1991]
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2. The Commission's Consideration of Important Factors in Ap-
praising a Concentration
Once a Community dimension exists, the Commission must appraise
the concentration to determine whether it is compatible with the Com-
mon Market. The Regulation allows the Commission to move beyond
mere consideration of the participants' size. It empowers the Commis-
sion to consider other important factors. These factors include the ef-
fect of a proposed combination on access to markets, suppliers and con-
sumers, market supply and demand, and any potential distortion of
competition." Under this broad provision, the Commission must ex-
amine virtually all elements important to EC antitrust concerns in its
analysis.47
3. The "Wild Card". Regulation Article 2(1)(a)
The Regulation is ambiguous about whether and to what extent the
Commission will consider factors other than traditional substantive
merger criteria (such as definition of relevant markets). The Regula-
tion requires the Commission, when reviewing proposed business com-
binations, to consider broadly not only the structure of all markets con-
cerned but also "the actual or potential competition from undertakings
located either within or without the Community."48 This is the so-
called "wild card." It is designed to increase the competitiveness of EC
firms in both the Common Market and the international market. The
Commission will undoubtedly consider the effect of foreign competition
upon ease of entry into the relevant market inside the EC in determin-
ing whether a dominant position exists. Whether the Commission will
play this card to erect barriers against the entry of foreign competition
46. Id. art. 2(1).
47. Id.
In making this appraisal the Commission shall take into account: ...(b) the
market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial
power, the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or
markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the
relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate con-
sumers, and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it
is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.
Id. art. 2(1)(b).
48. Id. art. 2(1)(2).
In making this appraisal the Commission shall take into account: (a) the need to
maintain and develop effective competition within the common market in view
of, among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual
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into the EC by merger, however, is unclear. Under this wild card provi-
sion, the Commission has broad powers to consider competition from
firms located outside the Community. The Commission might choose to
review, and possibly forbid, a merger between an EC firm and a non-
EC firm having a community dimension (or, even more unlikely, be-
tween two non-EC firms) solely on the basis of the foreign nationality
of the non-EC firm. 9
The expansive discretion that article 2(l)(a) of the Regulation gives
to the Commission raises some concern, however slight, among non-
EC-based firms." A loose reading of the wild card provision would al-
low the Commission to discriminate against non-EC firms.51 Under this
provision, the Commission might take the position that effective compe-
tition, stated as an EC goal, means European competition only.52 The
Commission could conceivably decrease American or other foreign pen-
etration into the EC and, thus, increase the competitiveness of Euro-
pean industry.53 The Regulation would bolster the Commission's pro-
tectionist position in two ways. First, the Regulation's preamble aims to
strengthen the EC's "economic and social cohesion."' 4 Second, the wild
49. Osborne, supra note 40, at 71. To the annoyance of business, the Regulation
does not offer the convenience of "one-stop shopping," except in the case of a merger
with a community dimension. Id. In other cases, acquiring companies seeking targets
will still have to knock at the doors of more than one regulatory body, and potentially
as many as 13. Id. See Allen & Overy et al., Merger Control in the EEC: A Survey of
European Competition Laws at 3 (Kluwer, 1988) (Prepared by the Brussels Offices of
Advokaterne Bredgade) (discussing the antitrust laws of the 12 member states). Indi-
viduals retain their right to bring actions under articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty when
the Regulation does not apply. A target company, for example, may sue in a national
court to prevent a hostile takeover under articles 85 and 86 even if no community
dimension exists. The Regulation repeals Regulation 17 insofar as Regulation 17 is
applied to concentrations having a community dimension. Regulation 17 is the main
implementing instrument granting the Commission the authority to enforce Treaty ar-
ticles 85 and 86. Removing Regulation 17 from the merger control Regulation prevents
the Commission from applying articles 85 and 86 to large-scale mergers meeting the
Regulation's quantitative thresholds. Thus the Commission cannot proceed under arti-
cles 85 and 86 against concentrations with a community dimension. And according to
the Preamble of the Regulation, Recital 7, the Commission will not proceed under
articles 85 and 86 where it cannot proceed under the Regulation.
50. See Regulation, supra note 1, preamble (establishing the EC's broad control
objectives).
51. Id. art. 2(1).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Preamble at 13. The Regulation provides:
Whereas it is necessary to establish whether concentrations with a Community
dimension are compatible or not with the common market from the point of view
of the need to preserve and develop effective competition in the common market;
whereas, in so doing, the Commission must place its appraisal within the general
framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives referred to in Arti-
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card provision mandates the Commission's consideration, inter alia, of
the effect on competition within the EC from undertakings located both
"within or without the Community."55
If the EC should ever choose to use article 2(l)(a) to review poten-
tial combinations on the basis of foreign nationality, its actions could
have significant political and economic effects upon the EC and its ma-
jor trading partners. 58 For example, the Commission could employ the
Regulation to force United States firms to plan their business combina-
tions in accordance with EC goals instead of American short-term
goals. 57 In many respects, EC commercial policy favors a long-term ho-
rizon for European corporations. EC citizens and policymakers en-
courage corporate decision-makers to downplay opportunities for quick,
cle 23 of the Treaty, including that of strengthening the Community's economic
and social cohesion.
Id. (emphasis added).
55. See id. art. 2 (discussing the appraisal of concentrations). Article 2 of the Reg-
ulation states:
Article 2. Appraisal of concentrations.
1. Concentrations within the scope of this Regulation shall be appraised in accor-
dance with the following provisions with a view to establishing whether or not
they are compatible with the common market.
In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account:
(a) the need to preserve and develop effective competition within the common
market in view of, among other things, the structure of all the markets con-
cerned and the actual or potential competition from undertakings located either
within or without the Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and
financial power, the opportunities available to suppliers and users, their access to
supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand
trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and
ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress
provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to
competition."
Id. art. 2. (emphasis added).
56. See Regulation, supra note 1, art. 24 (discussing the EC's relationship with
non-member countries). Article 24 supports two opposing positions. The first position is
that the Commission has no intention of discriminating against non-member country
firms unless and until the foreign countries themselves discriminate against EC firms in
merger and acquisition activity. Id. The second position is that the Commission intends
to evince sensitivity to the national origins of firms proposing to merge. Id. Only the
Commission, subject to review by the European Court, knows at this juncture what the
"wild card" means, if anything at all.
57. See Enderwick, Multinational Corporate Restructuring and International
Competitiveness, 32 CAL. MGMT. REv. 44 (1989) (arguing that not only has the Amer-
ican horizon been short-sighted, it also may have been misdirected). Mr. Enderwick
asserts with empirical support that United States firms have restructured themselves in
order to control costs in their home markets and to overcome locational disadvantages.
Id. at 44. In contrast, Japanese firms and, by implication, European firms, have re-
structured themselves for the purpose of long-term investment and technological
change. Id. at 50. In the long term, the European and Japanese emphasis is probably
superior to the U.S. emphasis on international competitiveness. Id. at 57.
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and perhaps shallow, success and to concentrate instead on patiently
building strong companies for the decades ahead.58 This long-term ap-
proach would facilitate a smooth transition to the EC's goal of eco-
nomic harmonization in 1992 and beyond.
In contrast to the EC's long-term perspective, many American corpo-
rate decision-makers favor a more opportunistic, short-term approach
to their business decisions.59 To the extent that it exists, this myopic
American perspective may have emerged from such real threats as hos-
tile takeovers, greenmail, and quarter-to-quarter performance pressures
from large institutional investors, as well as misplaced risk-taking and
executive greed.6"
Although no empirical evidence indicates that the short-term view
yields less satisfying economic results, the shorter perspective of many
American managers may invite confrontation with the Commission and
the EC.6' Although the EC has not attempted to discriminate against
American firms, and it is unlikely that it will, it might attempt to force
them to modify their short-term view in favor of the longer-term Euro-
pean model.
The EC has internal mechanisms by which it may change American
perspectives. The Commission may forbid or indefinitely delay business
combinations involving American and EC companies.6 2 In addition, it
might attempt to prohibit mergers of non-EC firms whose expanded
market power would threaten to distort European competition. 3 This
alternative, however, is politically risky. Furthermore, the Commission
58. See Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. oF FIN.
1469 (1985) (warning of the dangerous practice of short-term business decision-
making).
59. Id.
60. See generally Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Cor-
porate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (providing theoretical background to corporate take-
overs); Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance.
32 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 163 (1987) (comparing 53 companies that paid greenmail with 57
companies that resisted greenmail); Briloff, Cannibalizing the Transcendent Margin.:
Reflections on Conglomeration, LBOs, Recapitalizations and Other Manifestations of
Corporate Mania, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 74 (1988) (calling for more stringent account-
ing and disclosure standards in the corporate arena); Narayanan, supra note 58, at
1469 (demonstrating managerial incentives for avoiding long-term goals); Roll, The
Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986) (arguing that ac-
quiring firms pay too much for targeted firms).
61. See Narayanan, supra note 58, at 1469 (providing reasons why firms should
avoid short-term decision-making).
62. See Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2 (asserting the need to preserve effective
competition through EC market control).
63. In a related matter, under a proposal sponsored by Luxembourg, the Commu-
nity could impose penalties on member countries for having unsound economic policies.
EC Gets Tough on Economies, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at A14.
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could forbid newly-combined foreign companies from doing business
within the EC.
If the Commission rigorously attempts to reduce the influence of
non-EC companies, the EC's major trading partners could opt to retali-
ate. 4 A full series of reprisals could quickly spin out of control, and
could possibly lead to an EC-United States trade war. This would jeop-
ardize the open trade policy that both entities have developed in the
post-war years.
B. THE COMMISSION'S EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS
The Commission also has the authority to impose extraterritorial
sanctions upon companies that violate the tenets of EC antitrust law
using either of two theories. First, the Commission could apply a single
economic unit theory in order to justify sanctions. Under this theory,
the wrongdoings of the parent and of the subsidiary companies are in-
distinguishable and indivisible.6 5 This theory allows the Commission to
assert unitary jurisdiction over the various members of a mul-
ticorporate enterprise. In attaining jurisdiction over one member of the
corporate group, the Commission could gain jurisdiction over the entire
entity.6" Second, the Commission could impose sanctions under the
more traditional respondeat superior theory. This theory holds a parent
company liable for the violations of its subsidiaries. Whether or not the
Commission can hold a European subsidiary liable for the foreign par-
ent's antitrust violations remains unclear.
If the Commission assumes jurisdiction over a merger between two
non-EC-based companies, the enforcement of any Commission order
may prove formidable, especially where neither company has a subsidi-
64. See, e.g., B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET & INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 950 (2d ed. 1986 and Supp. 1990) (noting the
Commission's control over mergers and acquisitions).
65. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The
Supreme Court held that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary compose a single
enterprise in the context of the Sherman Act. Id. at 771. Because the Sherman Act
requires a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, a parent and its
wholly-owned subsidiary cannot violate it. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990). Although the Court
did not address the jurisdictional issue, Copperweld, taken to its logical conclusion,
compels a unitary view of jurisdiction. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. In the EC, it is
unclear what position the European Court of Justice will take. See Bodson v. Pompes
Fun~bres, [1988] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2479, 2513-18, 4 Common Mkt. L.R. 984
(1989) (rejecting the enterprise entity theory insofar as it negates the possibility of
intra-enterprise conspiracy under article 86).
66. See Huie, Book Review, 12 FORDHAM INT'L J. 589, 597 (1989) (discussing
Copperweld's unitary view of jurisdiction).
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ary inside the EC.6' The situation appears slightly less problematic
where one or both of the foreign firms have a subsidiary inside the
EC. 8 For example, if the Commission ordered divestiture or attempted
to levy fines and penalties against a foreign firm, a full-fledged jurisdic-
tional battle between nations might erupt. If notions of comity between
the two states failed to calm the turbulent waters, the Commission al-
ternatively could seek a consensual arrangement in which the foreign
firms agreed to cease all practices that have deleterious effects upon
competitors within the EC. 9
II. ASSERTING EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
An examination of the case law on merger and acquisition activity in
the EC prior to the 1990 Merger Control Regulation is beyond the
scope of this article. 0 Instead, this article will assess the Commission's
and the Court's positions on asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over
merger activity. The focus will be on three distinct situations: (1) An
American firm acquiring an EC firm; (2) mergers between two non-EC
based firms having subsidiaries within the EC; and (3) non-EC-based
firms without EC subsidiaries.
A. SITUATION ONE: AN AMERICAN FIRM ACQUIRES AN EC FIRM
In Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co., v. EEC Cornm'n
(Continental Can), 1 the Commission and the Court, on appeal from
the Commission's decision, examined the strengthening of Continental
Can's dominant position by an acquisition of a potential competitor.
This case stands for the proposition that EC Treaty article 86 applies
to mergers. The Court, however, quashed the Commission's finding of a
violation of article 86 on the facts, because it disagreed with the Com-
mission's definition of the revelant product market.
In Continental Can, an American company manufacturing metal
containers (Continental Can) increased its shareholdings in TDV, a
67. Id. at 595 (discussing United States courts' assertions of jurisdiction over for-
eign activity, and the difficulties of enforcing judgments rcndercd extraterritorially).
68. Id. (arguing that the objective territorial principal would govern the situation
where one or both EC firms have a subsidiary inside the EC).
69. Regulation, supra note 1.
70. See B. HAWK, supra note 64, at 950 (discussing the application of articles 85
& 86 to mergers and acquisitions).
71. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co., v. EEC Comm'n, [1973] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 1973 Common Mkt. L.R. 199 [hereinafter Continental Can].
This remains the only formal decision in which the Commission has proscribed a
merger under article 86. For the Commission's decision, see Continental Can, Case 21/
72, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. DI 1 (1973).
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similar producer in the Netherlands, from ten percent to ninety per-
cent. TDV was the main Benelux manufacturer of metal containers for
tinned fish and meat. Before acquiring a ninety percent stake in TDV
(Netherlands), Continental Can already had a strong position in Ger-
many through its eighty-five percent-owned subsidiary SLW (Ger-
many). To accomplish the acquisition of TDV, Continental had created
another corporation called Europemballage (European Packaging) in
Delaware. Continental Can sponsored Europemballage's tender offer to
the shareholders of TDV, a company operating in the Netherlands.
The Commission maintained that Continental Can, through its Ger-
man subsidiary SLW, already owned a dominant position because it
controlled between eighty and ninety percent of the German market in
tin cans for fish, seventy percent of the German market in tin cans for
meat, and between fifty and fifty-five percent of the German market for
metal closures other than crown corks. The Commission, however,
failed adequately to consider the availability of substitutes. The Com-
mission held that Continental Can already held a dominant position
and had abused its dominant position, in violation of article 86, when it
acquired TDV (Netherlands). Before the aquisition, TDV (Nether-
lands) and SLW (Germany) had been capable of competing. Although
they were not actually in competition, the Commission decided that the
acquisition stifled effective competition in the Germany-Benelux area2
The Court disagreed.
The Commission stated that it could apply article 86 to an acquisi-
tion that strengthened a dominant position. The problem with applying
article 86 to mergers is that article 86 is silent on the creation of a
dominant position. It prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. Soon
after the Court's decision reversing the Commission on the facts, the
Commission proposed a merger control regulation for the first time.
Additionally, Continental Can poses a jurisdictional problem. Conti-
nental Can was not domiciled in and did not carry on any business
activity inside the EC. Continental Can argued that as a result of its
not having a registered office within the EC, the Commission lacked
jurisdiction to enforce article 86.73 Continental Can claimed that be-
cause its subsidiary Europemballage constituted the acting legal per-
son, the Commission could not ignore Europemballage's separate cor-
porate status and hold Continental Can liable for the behavior of its
72. Continental Can, 1973 E. COMM CT.J.REP. at 219. The Commission calculated
that the enterprise had market shares of 55% to 90% in the various relevant markets
before the contested acquisition.
73. Id. at 222.
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subsidiary. 4 It further argued that to do so would jeopardize the au-
tonomy of a separate legal person. Continental Can stated that SLW
(Germany), not Europemballage, held the dominant position; 7 thus,
Europemballage could not have violated article 86. The Court, how-
ever, rejected this argument. 6
The issue of extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction under the terri-
torial Effects doctrine did not arise in the Commission's view, nor in
that of the Court, because the parent was brought within the EC on
one of two theories: an ascription of liability theory, through the behav-
ior of its subsidiary; or through an SEU theory that views the offending
multicorporate actors as a single enterprise. Continental Can leaves un-
answered the question of whether article 86 applies to acquisitions
leading to market shares below the percentages in the case. Continental
Can presents facts that occur more commonly than Situation Three,
discussed infra, because a non-EC parent with enough market share to
trigger article 86 is more likely to have an EC-based subsidiary.
B. SITUATION Two: MERGER BETWEEN Two NON-EC-BASED
FIRMS HAVING SUBSIDIARIES WITHIN THE EC
Philip Morris/Rothmans" presented the Commission and Court
with a concentration between two foreign-based firms that had subsidi-
aries within the EC. Philip Morris, a United States company, sought to
merge with Rembrandt, a South African company. Each firm was reg-
istered and headquartered outside the EC. Philip Morris argued that
EC Treaty article 86 could not apply to permanent structural changes
in firms.
Philip Morris sought to acquire a minority shareholding position
which would allow it, as the acquirer, to exert influence over the mar-
ket behavior of the target firm. That is to say, there were agreements
between competitors, Philip Morris and the Rembrandt Group, that
granted Philip Morris a substantial interest in its competitor. These
agreements would allow Philip Morris to gain control of Rothmans In-
ternational, a company that Rembrandt solely owned, should
74. Id. at 223.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 242.
77. British Am. Tobacco Co. & RJ Reynolds Indus., Inc. v. Commission of the
European Communities (Philip Morris Inc. & Rembrandt Group Ltd. Intervening),
1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4487 [hereinafter British American Tobacco (Philip Mor-
ris)]. Although the Commission cites this case as applying article 85 to mergers, the
ECJ further limited the holding. Id. at 4509. This case, however, allowed article 85 to
apply to mergers. Id. at 4509-10.
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Rothmans Tobacco Holdings decide to sell its interest in Rothmans In-
ternational, and eventually to attain a position of parity with the Rem-
brandt Group.7
8
Three competing cigarette manufacturers, including R.J. Reynolds,
lodged complaints with the Commission concerning this arrangement.
These manufacturers alleged that Philip Morris, as a major competitor
of Rothmans, would exert undue influence over the operations of
Rothmans, thus distorting competition within the EC. The Commission
issued a statement of objection, finding that one company's acquisition
of a substantial interest in a major competitor constituted a restriction
on competition under articles 85 and 86.
After the Commission's objection, the companies concerned rewrote
the agreement, allowing Philip Morris to purchase only 24.9% of the
voting shares of Rothmans International. Despite the complaints of in-
dividual competitors, the Commission found that the agreement as re-
written did not violate the Treaty articles. On appeal, the European
Court of Justice, despite the opinion of Advocate General Mancini, re-
jected the application of the competitor plaintiffs, but stated that arti-
cle 85 applied to the acquisition of a minority share in a target com-
pany under certain conditions. Although article 85 could apply to
merger activity, it did not apply in this case because Philip Morris had
not intended to influence commercial behavior and, at that time, com-
petition did not appear to have been restricted .7  The Court set out
specific criteria for acquisitions and agreements that would restrict
competition in violation of article 85.80 Undoubtedly, the Commission's
continued use of article 85 as a tool for challenging mergers, coupled
with the Court's decision of November 17, 1987, in Philip Morris that
stands for the proposition that article 85 applies to certain mergers,
provoked the Council to enact the new merger control Regulation.
78. Id. at 4492-93. Rembrandt, the target company, solely owned Rothmans To-
bacco Holdings, a tobacco company having a majority share in Rothmans Interna-
tional. Rothmans International was a competitor of Philip Morris. Philip Morris made
an agreement with Rembrandt Group, Ltd., by which Rembrandt would transfer 50%
of the shares of Rothmans Tobacco Holdings to Philip Morris. This arrangement be-
tween Philip Morris and Rembrandt would transfer an interest to Philip Morris of
Rothmans International, one of Philip Morris' principal competitors.
79. British American Tobacco (Philip Morris), 1987 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. at
4524.
80. Id. at 4503-04. The Philip Morris case stands for the proposition that article
85 might apply to coordination of behavior by independent companies. Id. The Court's
decision leaves unanswered more questions than answered about the applicability of
article 85 to merger activity. Id. For example, the holding does not cover the applica-
bility of article 85 to a single firm's majority acquisition, nor does it discuss article 85's
applicability to an outright merger. See B. HAWK, supra note 64, at 952.
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C. SITUATION THREE: MERGER OF NON-EC FIRMS WITHOUT EC
SUBSIDIARIES
1. The EC's Application of the Extraterritorial Effects Doctrine
It is unclear whether the Commission will act under the merger con-
trol Regulation against a concentration between foreign firms possess-
ing no EC branches or subsidiaries even where the concentration pro-
duces harmful effects within the Common Market because the firms
export to the EC. If the Commission proceeds against these foreign
firms, it must do so extraterritorially.
In the recent Wood Pulp8" case, the Commission applied the extra-
territorial effects doctrine in order to assert jurisdiction under article 85
over foreign agreements to set prices taken abroad by firms having no
EC corporate presence, but exporting to the EC through independent
distributors. The Court found that the Commission could assert juris-
diction over the foreign firms that were engaging in the price fixing
only if the activity reprehended under article 85 was "implemented"
within the EC. In Wood Pulp, the effects felt in the EC market were
insufficient to ground jurisdiction, but the Court found the requisite
"implementation" within the EC. The Wood Pulp standard makes it
unclear whether the Commission and the Court would find an "imple-
mentation" within the EC when two non-EC firms without EC subsidi-
aries merge. It is likely that the Court would not consider such foreign
merger activity to be implemented within the EC. Even if the Court
extended Wood Pulp's holding to embrace openly the territorial effects
theory of jurisdiction, the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction would
raise serious questions of international comity.82 Moreover, the Com-
mission or Court of Justice would have difficulty enforcing any judg-
ment against the United States firms that have assets located outside
the EC.
81. Wood Pulp, 1988 E. CoMt. CT. J. REP. at 5215.
82. See Biweekly Summary No. 674, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 6 (1991). The
1992 program further harmonizes the internal EC market. After the consolidation of
the EC position, the world's three largest trading blocs will be the EC, the United
States, and the Pacific Rim countries. Jurisdictional clashes over the application of
each area's different competition laws are inevitable. In recognition of the need to coor-
dinate the application of their competition laws, the vice-president of the Commission
responsible for competition policy, Sir Leon Brittan, met on January 15, 1991, with
United States Attorney General Richard Thornburgh. They agreed that the EC,
through the Commission, and the United States, through the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, would seek to establish a legal framework designed to achieve coordination of
antitrust laws and to avoid conflicts from their application.
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Wood Pulp's extension to mergers between two foreign firms having
no EC subsidiaries but selling to the EC seems highly unlikely. There-
fore, it is unlikely that the Commission will apply the Regulation to
such concentrations. To act against these foreign firms, the Commission
would need to apply the controversial territorial effects theory of
jurisdiction.
In the Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, prior to Wood Pulp,
the Commission indicated its intention to adopt the territorial effects
doctrine. It argued that the EC competition laws clearly applied to un-
dertakings situated in foreign states "where their conduct has an appre-
ciable impact within the EC. ' ' 83 If a merger occurring outside the
Community distorts or impedes competition within the Community, the
requisite for the territorial effects is met.
The Regulation seems to apply to large-scale combinations between
two United States firms that have no EC assets but export goods to the
EC. The Regulation's definition of a Community dimension focuses on
the aggregate worldwide sales of all the firms involved, not on whether
the assets are located inside the Community.84 The Regulation catches
mergers of foreign firms, each of whose sales in the EC exceed 250
million ECUs, and where the aggregate worldwide sales exceed $5 bil-
lion ECUs unless each firm achieves more than two-thirds of its aggre-
gate Community sales within a single member state.8" Foreign compa-
nies involved in a proposed concentration with a Community dimension
should notify the Commission. Although no language in the Regulation
exempts this concentration from coverage, it is unclear under the con-
troversial Wood Pulp decision whether the Commission's scope of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction extends to this paradigm.
CONCLUSION
The new merger control Regulation grants the Commission the dis-
cretion to attempt to exert influence upon the behavior of foreign firms.
The Regulation also provides the opportunity for the Commission possi-
bly to discriminate against non-EC firms, such as large multinational
corporations headquartered in the United States whose mergers and ac-
quisitions have effects on trade in the Common Market. If the Com-
mission were to impose Europe's long-term business perspective on
American firms, it essentially would erect an invisible wall around EC
commerce. Resorting to such isolationism and protectionist measures in
83. Commission, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy (1982).
84. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
85. Id.
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an era of perestroika, free trade, and economic harmonization would
exact a high price from the EC for having enacted regulations which
encourage the United States to comply with long-term EC goals. 8 The
mere suggestion of Commission discrimination and the specter of the
concomitant foreclosure from Europe's multi-billion dollar markets,
may induce United States managers and stockholders to retreat from
their admiration of short-term as opposed to long-term goals. Further-
more, the Regulation raises questions of international comity because
the Commission may apply it extraterritorially to firms headquartered
outside, but having a presence inside, the EC.
An admittedly idealistic option for reconciling national differences
and clashes of conflicting and overlapping jurisdiction is a joint adop-
tion of the same set of substantive competition laws. This would im-
measurably reduce the tension between the United States, the EC, and
other trading partners. In addition, this would virtually eliminate the
use of the territorial effects doctrine of jurisdiction. If, mirabile dictu,
the same substantive antitrust laws were adopted, it would still be nec-
essary for national representatives to meet periodically to resolve con-
flicting interpretations of the law. Cause for optimism exists in the
wake of the January 15, 1991, agreement between the vice-president of
the EC Commission responsible for competition policy and the United
States attorney general to attempt to reconcile conflicting antitrust pol-
icies. The intent is to establish a legal framework for cooperation and
coordination of antitrust policy of the EC and the United States.
Another cause for optimism is the Commission's clearance of a pro-
posed acquisition of National Cash Register Company by the Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), announced January
21, 1991. Both companies are domiciled in the United States but have
considerable presence in the EC. The Commission found that the con-
centration would not create or strengthen a dominant position in the
relevant EC market. Therefore, the Commission found the acquisition
86. See Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1990, at AlI (discussing the EC's reduction of agricul-
tural trade barriers). In the current Uruguay Round of GATT talks, the United States
and the EC are apparently at loggerheads over agricultural subsidies. Id. The United
States wants to abolish subsidies, while the EC, with its politically popular Common
Agricultural Policy, seeks to continue subsidies. Id. In an obvious attempt to intimi-
date, the EC (France and Germany in particular) has announced that it will soon for-
bid importation of American beef products, claiming that beef from hormone-fed cattle
represents a health hazard to European consumers. Id. The United States has not yet
announced if it plans to retaliate. Id.; see also Implementation of Common Agricul-
tural Policy, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 425 (1973) (detailing the EC's cooperative
agricultural policy).
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compatible with the Common Market according to the terms of the
Regulation."
Until national differences are reconciled, the Commission should
carefully apply the "wild card" provision to monitor competition be-
tween EC and non-EC firms. The new Regulation has the appearance
of offering a potential morass of protectionism which, once entered,
could cause significant economic and political discord for years to
come. Now, in an increasingly global market, is hardly the time for
rash action.
87. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,719. AT&T is the world's leading telecommu-
nications company. NCR, the world's 12th largest information service company, had
resisted AT&T's proposed takeover. Id. NCR manufactures hardware in the EC, and
AT&T has wide-ranging activities inside the Community. Id. AT&T, for example, li-
censes UNIX, a widely used software package. Although the Commission will not op-
pose the acquisition, it is concerned with the linking of AT&T's telecommunications
and computer networking with NCR's workstations operations. Thus, the Commission
will continue to watch to ensure that the UNIX software package is readily available
to competitors of AT&T and NCR. Id. The Commission's announcement pays no heed
to the nationality of the companies, but focuses on competition concerns.
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